Abstract. In a previous paper 4], we introduced a non-deterministic -calculus ( -LK) whose type system corresponds exactly to Gentzen's cut-free LK 9]. This calculus, however, cannot be provided with a computational interpretation. Some of the constructs act as oracles and, for this reason, it is not possible to de ne an e ective notion of reduction. In the present paper, we address this problem. We consider a weak version of the implicative fragment of -LK, and we de ne for it a relation of reduction that models, at the level of the terms, the appropriate proof-theoretic notion of proof reduction. This reduction relation satis es several properties of interest, among others, the property of strong normalization. We prove this last result by using a reducibility argument la Tait.
In recent works, several authors have addressed the problem of extending the formulae-astypes principle to classical logic, in order to express the computational content of classical proofs 2, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19] . This problem cannot have a unique solution because one knows that the technical content of the formulae-as-types principle, namely the Curry-Howard isomorphism 3, 11, 14, 21] , is strongly related to the constructive aspects of intuitionistic logic. Therefore, when dealing with classical logic, one has to drop some of the properties that exist in the intuitionistic case. Then, according to the properties that one drops, the solutions proposed to the problem are di erent. For instance, cut-elimination in classical logic is non-deterministic. Hence, in order to obtain a classical calculus that satis es the Church-Rosser property, one has to restore con uence by de ning some appropriate reduction strategy.
Yet as another proposal, we introduced, in a previous paper 4], a non-deterministic -calculus ( -LK) whose type system corresponds to Gentzen's cut-free LK 9] . Our goal, however, was not to express the computational content of classical logic but rather to provide a model in which the non-deterministic and non-constructive aspects of classical logic can be explained.
Our idea was to introduce a dummy element (?) to allow for the rule of right-weakening, a non-deterministic binary choice operators (? ]?) to allow for the rule of right-contraction, and a non constructive choice operator akin to Hilbert's 16] to allow for the classical rule of right-implication. These features are highly non-deterministic. Moreover, because of the operator that acts as an oracle, this non-determinism must be interpreted in an angelic way. Because of this, it is not possible to provide -LK with usual reduction rules that would model faithfully the proof-theoretic process of cut-elimination.
In this paper, we study more deeply this last problem and we show that the angelic nature of -LK is only related to the operator . In contrast, the non-determinism that arises from the right structural rules may be handled by using appropriate reduction rules.
Technically, we consider a weakening of the implicative fragment of -LK that is obtained by dropping the operator. The resulting system, that we have called -wLK ! (read weak lambda-LK ), remains a non-deterministic typed -calculus. Its typing system is a sequent calculus whose sequents may be manifold concluded. The underlying logic, however, is intuitionistic because of some proviso on the introduction rule of implication. It is then possible to de ne a reduction relation between the terms of -wlk that models a proof-theoretic notion of proof reduction. This reduction relation satis es the properties of subject reduction, of Church-Rosser, and of strong normalization.
We prove this last property by using Gallier-Koletsos version of reducibility, as described in 8]. J. Gallier claims that this variant of the reducibility method is smoother than other versions in the sense that it can be easily adapted to various typed calculi. Our proof is also an illustration of this fact.
Problems with -LK
The idea behind the design of - LK 4] As far as cut-free proofs are concerned, the system -LK is satisfactory. If one allows for cuts, however, there is a mismatch between -reduction, which acts at the local level of the terms, and cut elimination, which acts at the global level of the sequents. This can be shown by considering the main step of cut elimination:
. . . In fact the problem of providing -LK with an appropriate reduction theory is twofold. On the one hand, as suggested by the above example, we should allow for non-e ective reductions related to the -construct. On the other hand, we must also provide reduction rules related to the constant ? and the operator (? ]?).
In this paper, we address the second question by considering the system -LK without the operator .
Formal De nition of -wlk !
In this section, we introduce formally -wlk ! , which is obtained from the implicative fragment of -LK by dropping the operator. For more motivations about the design of -LK we report the reader to our previous work 4].
De nition 3.1 (Syntax of Raw Terms) Let The relation of syntactic identity ( ) between the terms of -wlk ! is de ned as the nest congruence containing the relation of -conversion and satisfying the three following axioms: The non-occurrence condition of Rule (ix) is su cient to force our system to remain intuitionistic. This is not surprising because there is a strong connection between semantic tableaux and our system. For classical logic, the method of semantic tableaux corresponds exactly to the sequent system G1 of Kleene 15] . For intuitionistic logic there is no similar correspondence: in intuitionistic tableaux one deals with sets of F -signed formulas 5], while the succedent of any intuitionistic sequent contains at most one formula. The only di erence between intuitionistic and classical tableaux for propositional logic lies in the treatment of an F -signed implication or negation. The non-occurrence condition of Rule (ix) can be seen as a re nement of a similar proviso that exists in the case of intuitionistic tableaux. 
is intuitionistically valid.
4 Term and Proof Reduction
Prawitz has introduced, in the framework of Gentzen's NJ 9], the notion of normal proof 20]. Given any proof in NJ, its normal form may be reached by a process of proof reduction, which corresponds, through the isomorphism of Curry-Howard, to a relation of reduction between -terms. In NJ, a proof is not in normal form when the principal formula of an elimination rule is obtained as the conclusion of the corresponding introduction rule. In the case of implication, such a proof corresponds to a -redex. In our system, a formula may also be introduced by weakening and this possibility gives rise to additional reduction steps:
. We must also allow for structural reductions that are related to the commutation of the right-contraction with application. Putting these ideas together, we are led to the following de nition. The reduction relation is such that the reducts of a well-typed term are typable with respect to the same context and within the same sequence of statements. This result is a piece of evidence that the reduction relation between terms models faithfully the process of proof reduction. The relation of reduction also satis es the Church-Rosser property. 6 
Strong Normalization
In this section we establish the main result of this paper, i.e., the strong normalization of the well-typed terms of -wlk ! . To this end we introduce a weaker notion of well-typedness. For technical reasons, this de nition is a de nition la Church, and we assume the existence of a family (X ) 2T , where each X is a countably in nite set of variables of type . De terms is a term that is not an I-term (that is either a variable or an application). A stubborn term is a term that reduces (in zero or more steps) only to simple terms.
In fact the I-terms are the terms that correspond to introduction rules. Their key property is that they give rise to a redex when applied to another term. Therefore to show that an application M Q is SN, it is su cient to show that, for any I-term N such that M ! N, N Q is SN. This is an instance of the property (P3) in 8].
The stubborn terms, on the other hand, when applied to another term cannot give rise to a redex, even after reduction. Therefore, when a stubborn term is applied to another term, the resulting application and all its possible reducts are stubborn.
The strong normalization proofs consists of ve lemmas. The rst one concerns the following closure properties of the sets of reducible terms: Assume that M is not stubborn. We proceed by induction on .
If is atomic, we must show that M Q is SN. By assumption, N We have established that every reducible term is strongly normalizable. The next step, in a reducibility proof, is to establish that every term is reducible. To establish this second property, in the case of pure -terms, one needs rst to prove a lemma about -abstraction.
More generally, what is needed are such lemmas concerning each form of I-term. Thus we need here three lemmas. ]N) Q, which is simple, reduces to some I-term P , the reduction is necessarily of the following form: ? . This, together with subject reduction, proves Proposition 3.3, and gives us an e ective procedure to extract natural deduction proofs from a term in our system.
There are, however, good reasons why we did not allow for the additional reduction rules. On the one hand, they correspond to a sort of awkward call-by-value strategy. Rule (v), for instance, amounts to a kind of strictness while Rule (vi) says that the functions must be completely evaluated. On the other hand, they distroy the con uence of the calculus.
Conclusions and Future Work
The results that are presented in this paper can be extended in several ways.
While we have worked in the implicative fragment, the other propositional connectives can be taken into account as we exposed in 4]. Then the extension of De nition 4.1 to the system containing all the connectives is rather systematic, and the proofs of the di erent lemmas and theorems may be adapted.
As we already mentioned, there is a strong connection with intuitionistic semantic tableaux 5]. By adapting De nition 3.2 we could de ne a typing system in which the derivation of a typing judgment can be interpreted as an intuitionistic tableau. Then, strongnormalization would give us an e ective procedure to extract natural deduction proofs from semantic tableaux.
Our nal goal remains to analyze classical proofs. Therefore we must waive the side condition that comes with the introduction rule for implication.
A rst solution would be to reintroduce the -operator. With respect to this, the results that we have obtained in this paper are encouraging. In particular, the strong normalization proof is not a ected by the addition of the -operator, which corresponds simply to the addition of new constants. This observation, however, makes only one half of the job because we must also provide reduction rules to deal with . As we have stressed in the introduction, the natures of the non-determinisms related respectively to and to the right structural rules are di erent. In this paper, we have explained how to deal with the latter. In order to handle the former, we must accept to deal with reduction relations that are not con uent and not e ective. For instance, we must accept reduction rules such as the following: We are currently working on this solution.
